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Notes and Comments
NEW LIGHT ON PICKETING-THE BLUE BOAR CASE
The identification of peaceful picketing with the constitutional
guaranty of free speech has led to immeasurable confusion in the law
relating to picketing.1 For years state decisions have been vacillating,
attempting to keep in step with the changing Supreme Court policy
on the question. As a result, there has been an increasing need for
definite and enlightened decisions, aligning the state determinations
with the prevailing national policy. One such opinion was handed
down in 1952 when the Kentucky Court of Appeals was asked to en-
join a union from picketing peacefully. The ensuing decision 2 set what
appears to be a cornerstone in the foundation of the modern labor law
of this state. It should be noted, however, that the question in that
controversy was limited in scope to peaceful picketing, by a minority
of employees or by non-employees, where there was no dispute be-
tween the employer and the employees, and when the picketing
amounted to coercion of the employer to compel his employees to
unionize.
The case arose when the Blue Boar Cafeteria Co. in Louisville was
repeatedly asked to recognize the defendant union as bargaining agent
for the cafeteria employees. Blue Boar refused the request, stating
that it did not believe the employees wanted to affiliate with the
union. The union called a meeting of the 270 employees, but only
five people attended and those five refused to join. Nevertheless, the
union continued to make demands and subsequently had each of Blue
Boar's Cafeterias picketed by people who were, of course, not em-
ployees of the company. A temporary injunction was granted by the
Chancellor on grounds that there was no dispute between Blue Boar
and its employees.
Two years later the union re-opened the question by contending
that conditions had changed and that there was then an existing dis-
pute. A second Chancellor denied the injunction, relying on the earlier
Kentucky case of Blanford v. Press Pub. Co. 3 wherein it was held that
picketing could not be enjoined although no dispute existed. In ac-
cordance therewith, the Chancellor found that even though there was
'1 TELLER, LABOR DIsPuTEs AND CoLLtcrvE BAIOAINIING 98 (Supp. 1947);
also in 56 HABv. L. R. 180 (1948).
'Blue Boar Cafeteria Co., Inc. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bar-
tenders International Union Local No. 181, 254 S.W. 2d 335 (Ky. 1952.)
'286 Ky. 657, 151 S.W. 2d 440 (1941).
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again no dispute, the union was entitled to picket peacefully in order
to disseminate information relating to its grievances.
At this point the case was taken to the Court of Appeals. There it
was reversed, the court concluding that the Supreme Court of the
United States had reinvested "the several state courts with jurisdiction
to exercise control over organized labor where its activity contravenes
the law or the public policy of the state;"4 that the Kentucky statutes5
provide employers shall not be permitted to coerce their employees to
join or to refrain from joining a union; and that
* . . when we set it [the picketing] up against the factual background
of this case, it forms part of a pattern which clearly shows that the
union has employed methods, from the very beginning, which we
think could have had no other effect than to coerce Blue Boar to
compel all its employees to unionize."
Thus, the court held that the picketing should be permanently en-
joined because it was being carried on for a purpose which was con-
trary to the laws and public policy of the state. The court distinguished
this case from Blanford v. Press Pub. Co., supra, by pointing out that
the issue of coercion was not raised in that instance, and that the
earlier case was decided at the time when picketing was completely
identified with free speech. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court of the United States on October 13, 1953.7
Although the kinship between the right to picket and the right of
free speech has been the subject of many judicial opinions and legal
treatises, it is still difficult to predict with confidence the circumstances
in which picketing will be enjoined. Thus, a brief discussion of the
modem trend of opinion is a pre-requisite to the discussion of the
problems which have grown out of it. Prior to the present more favor-
able attitude toward unions, picketing was generally considered a
prima facie common law tort, permissible only when legally justified."
In 1937 this doctrine was shaken by a Supreme Court decision which
advanced, by way of dictum, the proposition that the right to make
known the facts of a labor dispute is included in the freedom of speech
guaranty of the Constitution.9 This evidently had an appealing ring,
and it appeared to become firmly entrenched in 1940 when the Court,
in two famous cases, held peaceful picketing to be a form of speech
and therefore entitled to protection under the First Amendment. 0
'Supra note 2 at 338.
'Ky. REv. STAT. 836.130 (1948).
6 Supra note 2 at 339.
'22 LV 3085 (1953).
'Supra note 1 at 70.
'Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union, 801 U.S. 468 (1937).
" Thornhill v. Alabama, 810 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S.
106 (1940).
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The Court's movement toward the extreme reached its peak in 1941
when it was held in American Federation of Labor v. Swing" that due
to the constitutional rights involved, peaceful picketing could not be
enjoined even when there was no dispute between the employer and
his employees.
While this doctrine was developing, the state courts had struggled
to keep their decisions in conformity with those of the Supreme Court,
since the question had become one of such widespread federal cogni-
zance.1 2 But shortly thereafter even the late state decisions were out-
moded as the Supreme Court, finding itself in an untenable position,
began to backtrack.' 3 In a series of cases14 the Court expounded upon
and extended its previous decisions until the idea evolved that "while
picketing has an ingredient of communication it cannot dogmatically
be equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of speech."'u
Picketing, it was recognized, is of a dual nature as both speech and
economic warfare; and since it is more than a form of communication,
regulations can be made which would not otherwise be permissible.'
Having concluded from these late holdings of the Supreme Court
that picketing is subject to regulation in certain instances, the im-
portant question before us today is under what circumstances can
peaceful 17 picketing be enjoined?
That peaceful picketing can be enjoined when its object is con-
trary to the public policy of the state is now clear' s The Supreme
Court has defined state public policy as that "found in [the state's]
constitution, acts of the legislature, and decisions of its courts"' 9-as
distinguished from public policy based on custom and mode. There-
fore, when picketing is carried on for an objective which is repugnant
-"312 U.S. 321 (1941); also see Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320
U.S. 293 (1943).
"Supra note 1 at 76.
ibid.
" Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725 (1942);
Bakery Drivers Local v. Wobl, 315 U.S. 769 (concurring opinion at 776-7);
Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 (1949); Building Service Em-
ployees International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Hughes v. Superior
Court of California, 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950).
' Per Frankfurter, J., writing for the Court in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Hanks, 339 U.S. 470, 474 (1950).
" See NOTE, 47 Mica. L. R. 1228 (1949).
" Cases wherein injunctions were sought on grounds of violence and threats
of violence are beyond the scope of this note.
" Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Bitter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) (Viola-
tion of state anti-trust law); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949)
(Violation of state anti-trust law); Building Service Employees International Union
v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (Violation of state labor disputes act); also see
ANNOTATION 11 A.L.R. 2d 1338, 1350 (1950); 31 Am. Jur. 948 (1940); NOTE, 36
VA. L. R. 1097 (1950).
'Building Service Employees National Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537
(1950).
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to the legislative acts or judicial decisions of a state, it may be enjoined
if the acts and decisions are constitutional.
The problems arising out of the public policy cases are varied and
often peculiar to the prevailing law of a certain state. However,
mention should be made of the dispute over what constitutes coercion
not only because of its importance in the Blue Boar case but also be-
cause of the frequency with which it arises in cases from other juris-
dictions.
Several states20 have statutes similar to the Kentucky enactment
which specifies that "Neither employers or their agents ... shall en-
gage . . . in unfair or illegal acts or practices or resort to violence,
intimidation, threats or coercion."2 ' When employers whose workers
do not wish to join the union allege that subjecting them to picketing
will force them to coerce their employees to join the union in contra-
vention of statutes similar to the one set out above, the question of
what constitutes coercion is brought to the foreground. The union gen-
erally replies that the picketing is not a form of coercion but merely a
bid for "recognition" or "organization" or "an attempt to make known
the facts." The proposition receives some support from a 1950 Supreme
Court decision where Mr. Justice Minton wrote:
The construction of the statute which we are reviewing only prohibits
coercion of workers by employers. We cannot agree with petitioner's
reading of this injunction that 'whatever types of picketing were to be
carried out by the union would be in violation of the decree.'
Respondent does not contend that picketing per se has been enjoined
but only that picketing which has as its purpose violation of the
policy of the State. There is no contention that picketing directed at
employees for organization purposes would be violative of that policiy.
(Emphasis supplied)
From these words it would appear that the Supreme Court believes
there could be picketing for organizational purposes which would not
be coercive.
On this subject Professor Sylvestor Petro of New York University
has written:
Picketing for organizational purposes is only fictionally different from
picketing for immediate recognition. The same kind of pressure on
both employer and employees exists in either case; furthermore, the
union is trying to force the employer to coerce his employees in either
case; and finally, the union's basic desire-the desire for exclusive
bargaining status-is the same in either case. The only difference re-
20 GA. CODE ANN., sec. 54-804 (1951 Supp); NL'v Yonx CoNsoLmATEn LAws
SERvicE, Vol. 6, see. 704 (1951); CODE OF VA., see. 40-70 (1950); Wis. STAT.
111.06 (1951).
= Supra note 5.
n Supra note 19 at 589.
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lates not to the conduct of the union, or its effects, but to the union's
explanation of its conduct. To make legal decisions vary on such a
basis seems peculiar, if not unique.'
These words were quoted with favor in the Blue Boar case when the
Kentucky Court asserted that despite the union's explanation for its
conduct, the picketing was coercive.
If, in the foregoing quotation from Mr. Justice Minton's opinion
for the majority of the Supreme Court, the emphasis in the last
sentence is placed on the word "employees" instead of the word
"organization," the sentence conveys a different meaning to the reader.
If by these words the Court meant to distinguish between the cate-
gories of persons against whom the picketing is being directed, rather
than between the alleged purposes behind the picketing, an incisive
reply is found in a California opinion wherein the court stated:
Nor does it help to argue that picketing may be directed against em-
ployees only, to persuade them to join the picketing union. In such
circumstances it is the employer's business which inevitably suffers,
and which may indeed be destroyed if it is a small one."
A second approach to the problem of whether picketing can be
directed against employees was taken by a Michigan court recently.
The union in that controversy had not contacted the employer at all,
but had set up a picket line admittedly for the purpose of inducing
the employees to join. The court in its decision asserted that not only
were the employer's rights unlawfully impaired, but the employees'
rights to sell their labor for an agreed price and to contract freely
upon any lawful subject (property rights) were denied without due
process of law.
2 5
It has been said that peaceful picketing cannot be enjoined on the
sole ground that there is no dispute between the employer and his
employees. 26 The Supreme Court indicates that it had taken a firm
stand on this issue so that the states could not prevent most picketing
by defining "dispute" in narrow terms.27 Yet it should be noted that
whether there is or is not an existing dispute between the employer
and his employees could be an important factor in determining
whether coercion is being practiced. If such a dispute exists, it is less
' PETRO, LABOR LAW JoUmNA (1951) as cited in Blue Boar Cafeteria Co. v.
Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Local No.
181, 254 S.W. 2d 335 (Ky. 1952).
- Seven Up Bottling Company v. Grocery Drivers Union, 233 P. 2d 617 (Cal.
1951).
"Winkelman Brothers Apparel, Inc. v. Local Union No. 299, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 22 Labor Cases, [Sec. No. 67, 262] (1952).
'American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, (1941).
"Id. at 326,
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likely that the objective of any picketing would be to force the em-
ployer to coerce his employees into acting contrary to their desires. On
the other hand, what picketing could not be deemed coercive when
there is no active dispute? Thus, when courts enjoin picketing on
grounds of coercion, are they in truth going in the back door when
they could not go in the front, i.e., enjoining picketing when there is
no dispute to protect the helpless employer? And if this is the result
of the coercion cases, is it not a commendable attempt to protect the
employer when he is himself not guilty of any act complained of by the
opposition, and when he is unable to seek any compromise without
adversely affecting the desires and interests of his employees?
Another issue brought to the foreground by the new picketing con-
cept is, can a minority of employees picket? If picketing were a pure
form of speech, the necessary answer to this question would be that
of course a minority can picket-a minority group has as much right to
free speech as a majority. Even with picketing considered to of a dual
nature, it is probable that, as in the cases where there is no dispute, the
courts would not enjoin picketing on the sole ground that it is being
carried on by a minority of a group of employees. But again analagous
to the dispute cases, the fact that the picketing is being carried on by
a minority is an important element in determining whether or not
coercion is being exerted. This issue is treated by the Restatement of
Torts which asserts:
... in the absence of applicable legislation to the contrary, this object
[collective bargaining] is proper though only a minority of the em-
ployer's employees are members of the union or engage in the con-
certed action.'
At the same time the Restatement makes it clear that:
An act by an employer which would be a crime or a violation of a
legislative enactment or contrary to defined public policy is not a
proper object of concerted action against him by workers.'
Thus, it would seem that even though, in theory, a minority can
picket,30 this action should be barred in states where coercion of em-
ployees on the part of the employer is prohibited, and the purpose of
the picketing minority is to induce the employer to so act.
In conclusion, it would appear from the holding in the Blue Boar
case that the present rule in Kentucky is-peaceful picketing can be
enjoined if its purpose is to effect something which is against the
public policy of the state; it is against public policy in Kentucky for
RESTATEmNT OF TOnTs, see. 785, comment b (1938).
RESTATEmENT OF TORTS, sec. 794 (1938).
See generally, State ex rel. Culinary Workers Union, Local No. 226 v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Ct. in and for Clark County, 66 Nev. 166, 207 P. 2d 990 (1949);
Whitehead v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 Fla. 667, 3& So. 2d 382 (1948).
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an employer to coerce his employees to join a union; hence picketing,
the purpose of which is to force the employer to so coerce his em-
ployees, is enjoinable. Even though picketing cannot be enjoined
either for the sole reason that (1) there is no dispute between the
employer and his employees or (2) that only a minority is partici-
pating, it can be inferred from the practical effect of the Blue Boar
case that when either of these factors exists, a finding of coercion is
likely to follow.
DnuE McKMG WALDEN
PROCEDURE IN MINORS' TORT CLAIMS IN KENTUCKY
Because of their incapacity, both legal and natural, minors' in-
terests must be protected from designing persons who would take ad-
vantage of them. Hence they are said to be favorites of the courts
who assume the role of protector. The purpose of this note is to out-
line the procedure by which this protection is afforded in Kentucky,
its scope being limited to the compromise and settlement of minors'
tort claims. Since an infant cannot maintain an action until he has
reached majority, when he has a claim for personal injuries a suit may
be brought for him in one of two ways. A guardian may be ap-
pointed to settle or prosecute the claim, or a person qualifying as next
friend may bring suit in the name of the minor. Sometimes the par-
ents acting on behalf of the minor settle and release the claim of the
child not knowing they have no authority to do so, and unaware that
the release is ineffective. Each of the above methods will be discussed
in greater detail in the body of this note in the order which they ap-
pear above.
In many situations where the minor has a claim for personal in-
juries his interests are placed in the hands of a legally appointed
guardian.' This guirdian is one whose appointment is provided for
by statute,2 and is not to be confused with the natural guardian who
is either a parent or next of kin. The statutory guardian may be any
person who has first made proper application to the county court in
accordance with the applicable Kentucky statutes,3 and has met with
the approval of the county court. There is, however, an order of
precedence placed upon those who may be appointed guardian: 1)
If both parents are living, whichever is most suitable, 2) if one is
'Ky. RuLEs CiviL PRoc. see. 17.03 (1953).
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 387.025 (1953).
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 387.020 (1958). Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 387.025 (1953).
